Karzai is a Pashtun, of the Durrani tribe. Hekmatyar is a Pashtun-Kharoti. Academics and journalists love to throw these details out to add context to a story. But what does it mean politically for Afghanistan and its people’s pursuit of peace? Here’s a quick guide to how Afghanistan’s tribal leadership, justice and dispute resolution system works, with links to the best related online media:
Marakas, Jirgas, and Shuras, Oh My
The Pashtun, Tajik, Hezara, Baluchi, Kuchi, Turkmen, and other ethnic groups of Afghanistan share a traditional societal structure academics call “segmentary lineage”. Others call it “tribal society.” Like many Arabs, Punjabis, Somalis, Chechens, and other groups, the people of Afghanistan have a long reliable path to peace in their traditional dispute resolution mechanism, which functions along their network of traditional tribes and clans which is, collectively, more powerful than the fledgling government. Yet many global decision-makers postpone talk with the tribal network and focus first on the state at risk of forging a law or agreement no one plans to follow.
When an Afghan family runs into a challenge—a wedding, birth, harvest, murder, rape, fistfight, stolen chicken, discovery of an alien spaceship, or what-have-you—the father does not go first to the state police or mayor, he typically goes to his bloodline elder.
Depending on the difficulty of the challenge or dispute, the elder may decide to elevate the issue to the bloodline village council (maraka, in Pashtun), the tribal council representing the local collection of related tribal clans of the same language group (qawmi jirga, in Pashtun), or even an ad hoc regional council (shura). If there is an issue of great national importance, either for a single ethnic group or across ethnic groups, the leading elders may call a grand national council hearing (loya jirga). Tajiks and others typically use the Arabic word, majlis, for similar councils.
Only if the traditional bloodline representatives, applying traditional or customary law (Pashtuns call theirs the narkh; and their sub-code for personal behavior, pashtunwali) with the aid of their Islamic advisor (most follow the Hanafi school, but the ultra-conservative Taliban follow a Salafist code), will the elders bring the issue to the state. Here’s a great introduction to the Pashtun traditional dispute resolution system, followed by a link to a list of Pashtun tribes:
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan017434.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pashtun_tribes
Tribal Alliances and Relations with Fighting Groups
Knowing how to quickly navigate the tribal network from the bottom-up has enabled the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and many mujahedin groups before them to secure the loyalties of, or some would say to blackmail, local leaders much faster and for longer periods than foreign armies and urban bureaucrats, who typically negotiate from the top-down, have been able to.
However, since 2003, the ruling government of Afghanistan has teamed up with NATO and aid agencies to carry out an enormous, hybrid civilian-military collaboration with tribal councils called the “National Solidarity Programme” (NSP). It is one of the largest efforts in history of an international force seeking to rapidly merge or interweave traditional, Islamic, and state representational and justice systems in a country. See more about the NSP, followed by how the Afghan government is structured, here:
http://www.nspafghanistan.org/
http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/afghan-government
Many tribal leaders now get a chance to hear presentations not only from the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or unrelated aid agencies operating in the area. They now also get contrasting series of Powerpoint seminars from NSP aid workers as well as the Afghan government which hopes integrating the tribal with the state will enable Kabul to forge and secure alliances more successfully than the Taliban.
Difficult Choices for Local Leaders
It ain't as easy as choosing between liberal economic opportunity and an ultra-conservative Stone-Age poverty. Frontline village leaders along the Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian border often face a harrowing choice which could lead to their community’s salvation or destruction.
Even if a village leader wishes to pursue peace or even join one side in a conflict, his first loyalty must typically be to his community’s tribal affiliation. Collectively, the tribal alliances then must choose whether to pick a side, remain neutral, or pretend to be on the side of whomever shows up that day.
The NSP/Government or Taliban delegations typically come as political or even as humanitarian missions. They park their cars by the hard top highway and hike up a narrow mountain path, lugging laptops, hand books, and rifles (though aid workers with the NSP usually do not and should not go armed) until they reach the outer line of farmers or herders.
The first local man to spot the delegation goes himself or sends his son up to the head of the maraka, a traditional bloodline council of elders, who either calls a militia to scare the delegation away or, more often, prepares a place for the council to host the group for tea.
The first group to query the local council before any major fighting erupts in the area is usually the Taliban. Sometimes there is rumored to be a representative from Al Qaeda. The Taliban delegation knows how the traditional law and decision-making process works and they are led from the battlefield; that is why they are the first to make their plea. They argue in their special way how the local tribal group, and its autonomous militia, should support the Taliban for God, country, etc, or face mysterious fate, x.
Then the combined NSP team arrives, a bit higher tech, a bit less armed, to make their case. Where the Taliban offers salvation, the NSP team offers economic integration and greater regional decision-making power.
At this point, if the tribal leaders choose to be neutral, they will continue to get approached from both sides who may return with greater motivational tools or more painful choices. If the tribal leaders pick one side, very likely the next months will bring some form of violence form the side which was rejected. To pretend to be on both sides would guarantee that the winner will remember their support, but to be discovered as a collaborator with the enemy could bring even greater destruction than choosing a side.
While the Afghan government and international forces are relying on the NSP and related civil-military efforts to sell the most attractive package to gain the trust and support of local tribal decision-makers, Pakistan, modeled on Iraq with US backing, is bolstering their offer by offering the tribal councils weapons with which to arm their local militias in exchange for their alliance. Here’s more on that:
http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-36603220081120
To best comprehend this campaign to win the trust of thousands of local tribal councils, imagine an election campaign in which your community has to vote in a block and whichever party you do not vote for may show up one day and arrest all of the male leaders or simply burn the village down.
If you have more information, preferred links, or would like to discuss this, please add your comments below.
Marakas, Jirgas, and Shuras, Oh My
The Pashtun, Tajik, Hezara, Baluchi, Kuchi, Turkmen, and other ethnic groups of Afghanistan share a traditional societal structure academics call “segmentary lineage”. Others call it “tribal society.” Like many Arabs, Punjabis, Somalis, Chechens, and other groups, the people of Afghanistan have a long reliable path to peace in their traditional dispute resolution mechanism, which functions along their network of traditional tribes and clans which is, collectively, more powerful than the fledgling government. Yet many global decision-makers postpone talk with the tribal network and focus first on the state at risk of forging a law or agreement no one plans to follow.
When an Afghan family runs into a challenge—a wedding, birth, harvest, murder, rape, fistfight, stolen chicken, discovery of an alien spaceship, or what-have-you—the father does not go first to the state police or mayor, he typically goes to his bloodline elder.
Depending on the difficulty of the challenge or dispute, the elder may decide to elevate the issue to the bloodline village council (maraka, in Pashtun), the tribal council representing the local collection of related tribal clans of the same language group (qawmi jirga, in Pashtun), or even an ad hoc regional council (shura). If there is an issue of great national importance, either for a single ethnic group or across ethnic groups, the leading elders may call a grand national council hearing (loya jirga). Tajiks and others typically use the Arabic word, majlis, for similar councils.
Only if the traditional bloodline representatives, applying traditional or customary law (Pashtuns call theirs the narkh; and their sub-code for personal behavior, pashtunwali) with the aid of their Islamic advisor (most follow the Hanafi school, but the ultra-conservative Taliban follow a Salafist code), will the elders bring the issue to the state. Here’s a great introduction to the Pashtun traditional dispute resolution system, followed by a link to a list of Pashtun tribes:
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan017434.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pashtun_tribes
Tribal Alliances and Relations with Fighting Groups
Knowing how to quickly navigate the tribal network from the bottom-up has enabled the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and many mujahedin groups before them to secure the loyalties of, or some would say to blackmail, local leaders much faster and for longer periods than foreign armies and urban bureaucrats, who typically negotiate from the top-down, have been able to.
However, since 2003, the ruling government of Afghanistan has teamed up with NATO and aid agencies to carry out an enormous, hybrid civilian-military collaboration with tribal councils called the “National Solidarity Programme” (NSP). It is one of the largest efforts in history of an international force seeking to rapidly merge or interweave traditional, Islamic, and state representational and justice systems in a country. See more about the NSP, followed by how the Afghan government is structured, here:
http://www.nspafghanistan.org/
http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/afghan-government
Many tribal leaders now get a chance to hear presentations not only from the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or unrelated aid agencies operating in the area. They now also get contrasting series of Powerpoint seminars from NSP aid workers as well as the Afghan government which hopes integrating the tribal with the state will enable Kabul to forge and secure alliances more successfully than the Taliban.
Difficult Choices for Local Leaders
It ain't as easy as choosing between liberal economic opportunity and an ultra-conservative Stone-Age poverty. Frontline village leaders along the Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian border often face a harrowing choice which could lead to their community’s salvation or destruction.
Even if a village leader wishes to pursue peace or even join one side in a conflict, his first loyalty must typically be to his community’s tribal affiliation. Collectively, the tribal alliances then must choose whether to pick a side, remain neutral, or pretend to be on the side of whomever shows up that day.
The NSP/Government or Taliban delegations typically come as political or even as humanitarian missions. They park their cars by the hard top highway and hike up a narrow mountain path, lugging laptops, hand books, and rifles (though aid workers with the NSP usually do not and should not go armed) until they reach the outer line of farmers or herders.
The first local man to spot the delegation goes himself or sends his son up to the head of the maraka, a traditional bloodline council of elders, who either calls a militia to scare the delegation away or, more often, prepares a place for the council to host the group for tea.
The first group to query the local council before any major fighting erupts in the area is usually the Taliban. Sometimes there is rumored to be a representative from Al Qaeda. The Taliban delegation knows how the traditional law and decision-making process works and they are led from the battlefield; that is why they are the first to make their plea. They argue in their special way how the local tribal group, and its autonomous militia, should support the Taliban for God, country, etc, or face mysterious fate, x.
Then the combined NSP team arrives, a bit higher tech, a bit less armed, to make their case. Where the Taliban offers salvation, the NSP team offers economic integration and greater regional decision-making power.
At this point, if the tribal leaders choose to be neutral, they will continue to get approached from both sides who may return with greater motivational tools or more painful choices. If the tribal leaders pick one side, very likely the next months will bring some form of violence form the side which was rejected. To pretend to be on both sides would guarantee that the winner will remember their support, but to be discovered as a collaborator with the enemy could bring even greater destruction than choosing a side.
While the Afghan government and international forces are relying on the NSP and related civil-military efforts to sell the most attractive package to gain the trust and support of local tribal decision-makers, Pakistan, modeled on Iraq with US backing, is bolstering their offer by offering the tribal councils weapons with which to arm their local militias in exchange for their alliance. Here’s more on that:
http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-36603220081120
To best comprehend this campaign to win the trust of thousands of local tribal councils, imagine an election campaign in which your community has to vote in a block and whichever party you do not vote for may show up one day and arrest all of the male leaders or simply burn the village down.
If you have more information, preferred links, or would like to discuss this, please add your comments below.
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