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When one hears a compelling tale of war and loss in Afghanistan from NPR’s Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson or the New York Times’ Carlotta Gall, one wants to understand where and in what context these stories took place. Some might get a bit confused about how one part of the country is suffering combat while other parts are enjoying revival.

Here is a quick reference guide to Afghanistan, region by region, which should help Afghan Watchers better understand how war and peace coexist in the tumultuous country as of July 2009. (Map link coming soon)


Frontlines
US-led International and Afghan forces pursue a strategy of consolidating control over the central region, then pushing south and east into traditional Taliban strongholds, under-staffing the north since it is traditionally anti-Taliban. However, the Taliban have a counter-strategy of avoiding frontlines altogether, attacking politicians, police stations and military convoys in all parts of the country including the north. The insurgent strategy at first seems illogical. Why waste costly weapons and valuable manpower attacking areas of the north they can’t possibly woo? Well, imagine what would happen if 30,000 US forces currently concentrated on 19 provinces are forced to re-distribute 5 or 6 more provinces without any additional troops? Their current strongholds will be under-staffed and therefore more vulnerable. To complicate this forward probability is the suggestion by many Afghans that the presence of the international forces is itself one reason many otherwise impartial young men join the insurgency. Here are some recent articles which sum up the regions.

NATIONAL. Troop Surge across the central region and eastern and southern fronts: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/blog/2009/02/afghanistan_a_h.html  

SOUTHERN FRONT. “Helmandis Braced for Taleban Battle”: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=353865&apc_state=henparr  

ONCE PEACEFUL NORTH. “Insurgency Gaining Ground in Afghan North”: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=354177&apc_state=henparr  


Central Government Strongholds Still Facing Resistance

The Afghan Government’s center of power is in the long-time capitol, Kabul. US-led international forces remain focused on holding Kabul despite continued terror attacks and raids by Taliban insurgents. Meanwhile, large swaths of the central mountainous region remain under Afghan government control with Afghan and international security bases, but continue to suffer hit-and-run attacks by insurgents based in the rural areas. Here life is cyclical. During the winter as insurgent attacks dissipate, many people are optimistic enough to invest in new enterprises, plan their future. But each spring, insurgent attacks return, Afghan troops block roads to search vehicles, leading to a tense mood through autumn.

KABUL. Nadene Ghoury reports for PBS Frontline World, “Afghanistan: Law and Order”: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/rough/2009/04/afghan_law_and.html  

PANJSHIR, WARDAK, GHAZNI, ZABUL, PARWAN, KAPISA, NURISTAN, NANGARHAR. While the central government controlled provinces range from Panjshir, the high valley long-controlled by Tajiks once led by the North Alliance commander Ahmed Massoud which remains behind the government, to Nangarhar, the province hosting a periodically secure roadway through Jalalabad and the Khyber Pass to Pakistan which is sometimes put on high alert for Taliban raids.


The Eastern Front

The mountainous northeastern Afghan-Pakistani border has hosted great shifts in political power since the beginning of Afghanistan’s civil war in 1979. It is important to understand that each mountain valley hosts a different political context with some communities attempting to remain neutral, others trying to placate all sides in the conflict to avoid destruction, and others remaining steadfast partners with one of the fighting sides. While local farming and herding communities have often remained rooted on their land for decades, if not centuries, the fighting groups tend to migrate in and out depending on their battlefield successes and failures. Most commonly, Taliban fighters, sometimes backed by Al Qaeda advisors or partners, will meet with councils of elders for each of the isolated highland communities and try to woo them to their side until US-backed Afghan forces compel them to flee for safety in the nearby Tribally-Administered autonomous areas of northwest Pakistan.

KUNAR & KHOST. Here’s an interesting US military dispatch series which presents the region from that perspective, Matt Dupee’s Long War Journal: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/02/afghan_militants_nab.php  

LAGHMAN, LOGAR, PAKTYA, PAKTIKA.


The Southern Front
After an initial focus on the Taliban base of Kandahar and long-time capitol of Kabul in 2001, US-led international and Afghan forces put the brunt of their fight on the eastern border with Pakistan. By 2009, a revised surge strategy has led to Operation Khanjar, a broad campaign to liberate the southern provinces of Helmand and southern Kandahar from the Taliban. Disputed Uruzgan province may be next.

HELMAND & KANDAHAR. IWPR‘s Dayee and Tassal report “Helmandis Braced for Taliban Battle”: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=353865&apc_state=henparr  

URUZGAN.


Taliban Strongholds in South, Where There are Few International Forces
While US-led international forces have backed Afghan government forces in its struggle to control the northeast, central, and south central parts of the country, Afghan forces still plea for additional international support to secure troubled Farah, where US forces are building a presence, and Nimroz, the remote desert region on the Iranian border where Afghan government forces face the Taliban backed only by a few loyal tribal leaders. This region is best known for the recent, tragic civilian casualty incident in Farah.

FARAH. Jason Motlagh reports on the US airstrike on Farah which went awry, for PBS Frontline World: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/blog/2009/05/afghanistan_the_2.html 

NIMROZ. Few Western journalists are covering this vital, troubled province.


Long-Peaceful Areas in the North and West Now At-Risk for New Conflict
Northern Afghanistan, from the northwestern desert province of Herat to the northeastern alpine province of Badakhshan, has long been anti-Taliban. This is largely because of three reasons. First, the Taliban leadership has long been seen by northern Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hezaras, Kuchis, and Wakhis as an ethnic Pashtun-led organization. Second, northerns tend to have more moderate Islamic views, largely due to tradition but also related to the relations many Tajiks and Uzbeks have with their ethnic brethren in post-Soviet central Asia. Finally, ethnic Tajik and Uzbek strongmen created mini-kingdoms in parts of the north , choosing to treat the Taliban as a foreign political force. While Massoud dominated the Panjshir Valley, Rabbani dominated the northern provinces of Takhar, and Badakhshan, Dostum ran Mazar/Balkh, and so on. Today, times have changed as many young men without income or future prospects are becoming angry at the presence of foreign troops and considering joining the insurgency.

KUNDUZ & JOWZJAN. IWPR’s Abdul Latif Sahak reports that the Taliban have taken the town of Chahrdara, Kunduz, and threaten Jowzjan in a region formerly assumed to be solidly pro-government: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=354177&apc_state=henparr  

HERAT. Jason Motlagh reports on under-reported civilian casualty incidents in areas including Herat for Time Magazine: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1900842,00.html  

BALKH, BAGHDIS, GHOR, FARYAB, SARI PUL, SAMANGAN, BAMYAN, BAGHLAN, TAKHAR, BADAKHSHAN


As time marches on, one will very likely see the political situation evolve, so stay tuned to changes to the above summary.
Karzai is a Pashtun, of the Durrani tribe. Hekmatyar is a Pashtun-Kharoti. Academics and journalists love to throw these details out to add context to a story. But what does it mean politically for Afghanistan and its people’s pursuit of peace? Here’s a quick guide to how Afghanistan’s tribal leadership, justice and dispute resolution system works, with links to the best related online media:

Marakas, Jirgas, and Shuras, Oh My

The Pashtun, Tajik, Hezara, Baluchi, Kuchi, Turkmen, and other ethnic groups of Afghanistan share a traditional societal structure academics call “segmentary lineage”. Others call it “tribal society.” Like many Arabs, Punjabis, Somalis, Chechens, and other groups, the people of Afghanistan have a long reliable path to peace in their traditional dispute resolution mechanism, which functions along their network of traditional tribes and clans which is, collectively, more powerful than the fledgling government. Yet many global decision-makers postpone talk with the tribal network and focus first on the state at risk of forging a law or agreement no one plans to follow.

When an Afghan family runs into a challenge—a wedding, birth, harvest, murder, rape, fistfight, stolen chicken, discovery of an alien spaceship, or what-have-you—the father does not go first to the state police or mayor, he typically goes to his bloodline elder.

Depending on the difficulty of the challenge or dispute, the elder may decide to elevate the issue to the bloodline village council (maraka, in Pashtun), the tribal council representing the local collection of related tribal clans of the same language group (qawmi jirga, in Pashtun), or even an ad hoc regional council (shura). If there is an issue of great national importance, either for a single ethnic group or across ethnic groups, the leading elders may call a grand national council hearing (loya jirga). Tajiks and others typically use the Arabic word, majlis, for similar councils.

Only if the traditional bloodline representatives, applying traditional or customary law (Pashtuns call theirs the narkh; and their sub-code for personal behavior, pashtunwali) with the aid of their Islamic advisor (most follow the Hanafi school, but the ultra-conservative Taliban follow a Salafist code), will the elders bring the issue to the state. Here’s a great introduction to the Pashtun traditional dispute resolution system, followed by a link to a list of Pashtun tribes:

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan017434.pdf  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pashtun_tribes

Tribal Alliances and Relations with Fighting Groups

Knowing how to quickly navigate the tribal network from the bottom-up has enabled the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and many mujahedin groups before them to secure the loyalties of, or some would say to blackmail, local leaders much faster and for longer periods than foreign armies and urban bureaucrats, who typically negotiate from the top-down, have been able to.

However, since 2003, the ruling government of Afghanistan has teamed up with NATO and aid agencies to carry out an enormous, hybrid civilian-military collaboration with tribal councils called the “National Solidarity Programme” (NSP). It is one of the largest efforts in history of an international force seeking to rapidly merge or interweave traditional, Islamic, and state representational and justice systems in a country. See more about the NSP, followed by how the Afghan government is structured, here:

http://www.nspafghanistan.org/
http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/afghan-government

Many tribal leaders now get a chance to hear presentations not only from the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or unrelated aid agencies operating in the area. They now also get contrasting series of Powerpoint seminars from NSP aid workers as well as the Afghan government which hopes integrating the tribal with the state will enable Kabul to forge and secure alliances more successfully than the Taliban.

Difficult Choices for Local Leaders

It ain't as easy as choosing between liberal economic opportunity and an ultra-conservative Stone-Age poverty. Frontline village leaders along the Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian border often face a harrowing choice which could lead to their community’s salvation or destruction.

Even if a village leader wishes to pursue peace or even join one side in a conflict, his first loyalty must typically be to his community’s tribal affiliation. Collectively, the tribal alliances then must choose whether to pick a side, remain neutral, or pretend to be on the side of whomever shows up that day.

The NSP/Government or Taliban delegations typically come as political or even as humanitarian missions. They park their cars by the hard top highway and hike up a narrow mountain path, lugging laptops, hand books, and rifles (though aid workers with the NSP usually do not and should not go armed) until they reach the outer line of farmers or herders.

The first local man to spot the delegation goes himself or sends his son up to the head of the maraka, a traditional bloodline council of elders, who either calls a militia to scare the delegation away or, more often, prepares a place for the council to host the group for tea.

The first group to query the local council before any major fighting erupts in the area is usually the Taliban. Sometimes there is rumored to be a representative from Al Qaeda. The Taliban delegation knows how the traditional law and decision-making process works and they are led from the battlefield; that is why they are the first to make their plea. They argue in their special way how the local tribal group, and its autonomous militia, should support the Taliban for God, country, etc, or face mysterious fate, x.

Then the combined NSP team arrives, a bit higher tech, a bit less armed, to make their case. Where the Taliban offers salvation, the NSP team offers economic integration and greater regional decision-making power.

At this point, if the tribal leaders choose to be neutral, they will continue to get approached from both sides who may return with greater motivational tools or more painful choices. If the tribal leaders pick one side, very likely the next months will bring some form of violence form the side which was rejected. To pretend to be on both sides would guarantee that the winner will remember their support, but to be discovered as a collaborator with the enemy could bring even greater destruction than choosing a side.

While the Afghan government and international forces are relying on the NSP and related civil-military efforts to sell the most attractive package to gain the trust and support of local tribal decision-makers, Pakistan, modeled on Iraq with US backing, is bolstering their offer by offering the tribal councils weapons with which to arm their local militias in exchange for their alliance. Here’s more on that:

http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-36603220081120  

To best comprehend this campaign to win the trust of thousands of local tribal councils, imagine an election campaign in which your community has to vote in a block and whichever party you do not vote for may show up one day and arrest all of the male leaders or simply burn the village down.

If you have more information, preferred links, or would like to discuss this, please add your comments below.

Reconciliation instead of fighting

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I recently had a long conversation with an unenlightened American colleague of mine about the war on terrorism. "Just kill them all," he said. "These people do not know the value of life." He used the word "people" generously- I'm pretty sure he wanted to use a more sub-humane term.

Why is it so hard for people to understand that by killing more and more, we simply create more enemies and more terrorists, not less? While I understand there are a number of un-reconcilable elements in the world that have to be dealt with militarily, the vast majority really just want to live a normal life and stop fighting. This is especially true in Afghanistan, where many having experienced 30 years of war already.

We should be supporting efforts such as the Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission - http://www.pts.af. Reconciliation instead of fighting, don't you think?

Afghan Women Rally Against Oppressive Law

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afghan-teacher.jpgJust received a statement from Human Rights Watch saying "the government of Afghanistan should listen to the Afghan women who are planning to hold a protest on April 15, 2009, at great personal risk, and repeal or reform the Shia Personal Status law."

(Image: Afghan teacher. © Advocacy Project via flickr)

Washington's View of Kabul
April 3rd, 2009, Washington, DC  |  Joe Tsali 
 
*************************************************************
 
Last Thursday morning in Washington, DC, I jogged through a gauntlet of cherry blossoms in the icy rain to the Dirksen Senate Office Building. I hoped it would be fruitful to take time from my humanitarian aid management work to attend the Senate Confirmation Hearing for Karl W. Eikenberry, the Obama Administration's nominee for US Ambassador to Afghanistan.
 
The event illuminated for me exactly how difficult it will be for the Obama Administration to dramatically change the course of the US foreign policy train in Southwest Asia while it is still barreling down tracks built by the previous administration.
 

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